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FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY




Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of em-
bodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has 
also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, 
which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that 
there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that 
avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent 
with the Incarnation.
Trenton Merricks has recently argued that the best account of the divine 
Son’s becoming flesh is that the Son became a material object.1 More spe-
cifically, Merricks has claimed that
The incarnation points us toward physicalism. For the physicalist, unlike 
the dualist, can insist that becoming embodied is necessary for becoming 
human; she can insist that the Incarnation requires the Son to become in-
carnate. Moreover, and more importantly, the physicalist—but not the dual-
ist—can easily and straightforwardly account for God the Son’s having the 
body of Jesus and no other.2
There are at least three distinct claims being advanced here: (1) sub-
stance dualism (hereafter “dualism”) does not cohere well with the doc-
trine that the Son is uniquely embodied in Jesus’ body3; (2) dualism entails 
that a person can be human without being embodied, which is objection-
able; and (3) physicalism about human persons (hereafter “physicalism”) 
avoids these problems and thus provides for a superior account of the 
incarnation.
In this paper I shall rebut all three of Merricks’s claims. Specifically, I 
shall argue that his objections to dualism fail to adequately consider al-
ternative dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness. Furthermore, 
while physicalism does provide an account of embodiment that avoids 
his objections to dualism, its account of incarnation requires accepting so 
1Trenton Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” 
in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2007), pp. 281–300.
2Ibid., p. 299.
3He argues further that dualism seems to entail both that the Son is embodied in more 
objects than simply Jesus’ body and that the Father and Spirit are also embodied.
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many counterintuitive metaphysical principles that it is not an appealing 
alternative to dualism.
Before I begin, there are two important points of agreement between 
Merricks and myself, and I will presuppose both in this paper. First, the 
incarnation should be understood as the claim that the second Person of 
the Trinity became a human being, which minimally requires that he be 
related to his body in the same way that we are related to our bodies.4 
Thus, I shall not consider as options for the dualist accounts of the incar-
nation in which the second person of the Trinity assumes a human being.5 
Second, I shall not consider a kenotic approach to the incarnation as a way 
of escaping Merricks’s arguments.6
I. Dualist Embodiment
The primary dualist account of embodiment that Merricks targets is 
Richard Swinburne’s: “A person has a body if there is a chunk of matter 
through which he makes a difference to the material world, and through 
which he acquires true beliefs about that world.”7 Merricks takes this to 
mean that a soul x is embodied in a material object y iff x has direct causal 
control over y and y causes x to have sensory knowledge.8 Merricks’s prin-
cipal objection to this is that it entails that all three members of the Trin-
ity are embodied in every material object. Why? The divine persons are 
omnipotent, so they have direct causal control over every material object.9 
Moreover, their knowledge of what is happening in the world is caused by 
what happens in the world.
I assume that, typically, God knows something is happening because it is 
happening, and not the other way round. God knows what is happening in 
4Ibid., pp. 281–282. Perhaps this needs qualification, since he is the creator of his body, 
while we are not. Nevertheless, the relation we stand in to our bodies, the second person of 
the Trinity stands in to his body, whatever other relations he also stands in to it.
5E.g., Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’ Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” in The Incarnation, ed. 
Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 197–218; Thomas P. Flint, “The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist 
Suggestions,” Religious Studies 37 (2001), pp. 307–320; Thomas D. Senor, “The Compositional 
Account of the Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 24.1 (2007), pp. 52–71. Given my own un-
derstanding of the Incarnation, I am tempted to explain the difference between the view Mer-
ricks and I share and the “assumption” view by claiming that on the latter, the Son assumes 
rather than becomes a human being, but Tom Flint has convinced me that that is far too ten-
dentious and misleading a description (however accurate I think it is). It is worth noting that 
many who hold such views claim that the referents of “Jesus,” “Son,” and “second person of 
the Trinity” are distinct. In this paper, I understand all of them to refer to the same person, 
exactly like “Kal El,” “Clark Kent,” and “Superman” would if there were such a person.
6Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” pp. 288–289. Kenotic theories of the incarnation claim 
that the second person of the Trinity ceased to be omniscient, omnipotent, etc., while in his 
state of humiliation (i.e., while incarnate but before his resurrection and glorification).
7Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
p. 146.
8Merricks takes Swinburne’s account to require the body to cause knowledge in the soul, 
rather than merely true belief, as Swinburne states.
9Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” pp. 284–285.
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my body because it is happening there. Moreover, God knows that when 
particular experiences in my body are caused in particular ways, certain 
things are happening in the world around that body. Thus, God knows 
about goings-on in the world because of events in my body. (Of course, God 
also knows about those goings-on directly.) So it seems that events in my 
body cause knowledge of the world in each person of the Trinity. At any rate, 
it is hard to see a principled way of ruling out causation in this case without 
thereby ruling out something to which the Christian dualist is committed—
events in the body of Jesus causing knowledge in God the Son.10
For anyone familiar with the debates over divine providence and fore-
knowledge, it sounds like Merricks is here presupposing a radical version 
of open theism.11 But proponents of many alternative views of providence 
will be unmoved. For example, a theological determinist of the Calvinist 
or Thomist sort could resist this argument by denying that God knows 
contingent truths about the world by being caused to know them by con-
tingent objects. Rather, God causally determines everything that happens, 
and thus knows everything about creation by knowing his own intentions 
(or, as it was often stated, “by knowing his own essence”). And the ar-
gument will not move the Molinist, who holds that God’s providential 
decree included every last detail in the entire history of the world, so that 
God knows everything that happens in the world merely by conjoining his 
middle knowledge with his knowledge of his decree to actualize this world 
rather than another.12 Proponents of simple foreknowledge may also reject 
the argument, since it would entail that God’s foreknowledge is a product 
of backwards causation. Even other open theists could resist Merricks’s 
argument, for they could maintain that God knows what is happening in 
the world through his rational intuition. Perhaps every proposition, even 
those contingently true (and even tensed), is as self-evidently true to God 
as that 2 + 2 = 4 is to us.13
Does Merricks provide an argument for thinking that the above views 
are all false (the views of the vast majority of Christians throughout the 
history of Christianity), and that the radical open theist view he appears 
to present has the correct account of God’s knowledge? No. But is there 
perhaps something in dualist theism, missing from bare theism (or bare 
Christian theism), that implies that God’s knowledge of creation is caused 
by his creation? Does the dualist’s dualism somehow preclude her from 
10Ibid., pp. 286–287.
11I doubt he really was presupposing Open Theism, as he has endorsed Molinism in writ-
ing. See his Truth and Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 146–155. If it is not an 
expression of Open Theism, though, the meaning of the passage is unclear.
12Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), chap. 2. If one were to object that this is not sufficient, since such a conjunction 
would not give God knowledge of which tensed propositions are true now, the Molinist can 
simply add to his account that God always knows directly, through his perfect rational intu-
ition, what time it is, and so which tensed propositions are true now.
13William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: 
Omniscience (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 226–236.
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denying that such a causal relation holds? I see no good reason—and par-
ticularly nothing in dualism—that suggests that material entities cause 
knowledge in God, and again Merricks does not supply such a reason.14
Thus, the dualist can admit that the Trinitarian persons have direct 
causal control over every material object, but deny that they are therefore 
embodied, since these objects do not cause knowledge within them. But 
what then of Merricks’s complaint that this would preclude the incarna-
tion, since Jesus’ body would not cause him to have any knowledge? I see 
little force to this objection. Since Jesus is omniscient, his body does not 
cause him to know anything he does not already know. But this does not 
preclude some of his knowledge from being overdetermined. Perhaps Je-
sus’ body causes him to know things that he already knew anyhow. As an 
illustration of this, suppose that most of what Jesus (while incarnate, but 
pre-glorification) knew was subconscious or non-occurrent.15 Material ob-
jects would then cause Jesus’ body to cause Jesus to know certain proposi-
tions occurrently and thereby overdetermine his knowledge of them.
Whether these replies on Swinburne’s behalf are any good, I am in the 
end inclined to think that Merricks is right to reject this view of embodi-
ment, for it is implausible on other grounds. For example, it appears to 
entail that the seriously insane or those suffering from massive cognitive or 
neurophysiological malfunction are disembodied, since beliefs they form 
on the basis of sense experience will not count as knowledge. In addition, 
it entails that very young children, at least those in the first several weeks 
of their existence, are disembodied, since they presumably hold no be-
liefs, or at least none that meet all the conditions for knowledge (whatever 
those are). Nevertheless, there are alternative dualist accounts of embodi-
ment which avoid these problems and also avoid Merricks’s objections to 
Swinburne. Merricks briefly mentions and criticizes one of these, but the 
dualist has an available reply.16
As argued above, insisting that embodiment occurs only when the body 
causes knowledge in the soul is implausible. However, a relatively simple 
alternative would be an experience requirement. For S to be embodied in x 
is for S to have direct causal control over x and for x to cause sensory expe-
riences in S. On this account, there is no bar to the Son’s being embodied, 
since his omniscience does not preclude sensory experiences. Moreover, 
14One might object that, on a counterfactual account of causation, physical goings-on do 
cause knowledge in God, since, if they were to not happen, God would not have knowledge 
of them. Rather than suppose that this is a point in Merricks’s favor, I would take this as yet 
another reason to reject a counterfactual account of causation.
15J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), pp. 610–612.
16Merricks only discusses accounts of embodiment open to classical Cartesians. There 
are other versions of dualism, like those that claim that souls are spatially located or caus-
ally regulate their bodies’ biological functions, that can also give accounts of embodiment 
that avoid his criticisms. See, for example, Philip L. Quinn, “Tiny Selves: Chisholm on the 
Simplicity of the Soul,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1997), pp. 61–66; and J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human 
Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), pp. 199–228.
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the insane and the neurophysiologically defective still have experiences, 
even if they do not acquire knowledge on the basis of them. Merricks’s 
objection to this account is that it entails that when I am in a deep, dream-
less sleep, I am disembodied, since my body is not causing any sensations 
in my soul. “My soul might leave my body when I die, but not when I 
dreamlessly sleep!”17
Fortunately, the account can be modified to avoid this implication. In-
stead of requiring that the body actually cause sensations in the soul, the 
body should only be required to be disposed to cause sensations if it is 
in certain circumstances. Peter Unger and John Foster offer versions of 
this account of embodiment.18 An account of embodiment adopting this 
suggestion would be as follows: S is embodied in x iff S has direct causal 
power over x and x is causally disposed to cause effects in S.19
Merricks offers two objections to such an account. First, this makes em-
bodiment counterfactually dependent on non-actual circumstances, when 
intuitively it should be dependent on what is actual. Second, the account 
entails that disembodiment is impossible.
Consider a disembodied soul, whose former body has died. If that body 
were in sense-experience-causing conditions—conditions presumably re-
quiring it to be alive—then I suppose the soul would have the appropriate 
experiences. After all, the nearest counterfactual situation in which, for ex-
ample, Lincoln’s body is now alive is presumably, given dualism, a situation 
in which Lincoln’s soul is embodied.20
The dualist can resist these objections. Concerning dependence on non-
actual circumstances, I don’t see why this is such a large bullet to bite. 
But if one is worried by the objection, I don’t see why the dualist cannot 
reject counterfactual analyses of causal dispositions as insufficient. As 
for the latter objection (which seems to assume a counterfactual analysis 
of dispositions), Merricks is focusing on the wrong counterfactual condi-
tions. While it is true that If Lincoln’s body were alive, he would be embodied,21 
the proponent of the Foster/Unger account of embodiment thinks that 
Lincoln is embodied only if a counterfactual like If Lincoln’s body is 
punched, he feels pain is true. That counterfactual is currently not true (and 
17Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” p. 288.
18Peter Unger, All the Power in the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 456–
460; and John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the 
Mind (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 167. Foster appeals to individualistic causal laws rather 
than individualistic causal dispositions, but the resultant account of embodiment is basically 
the same as Unger’s.
19Tom Flint has suggested that the account should be modified further so that S only be 
required to be disposed to have direct causal power over x. Without this modification, the ac-
count is subject to counterexamples involving paralyzing drugs, as they seem to temporarily 
remove direct causal power, yet surely paralyzed people can be embodied. I’m inclined to 
think that Flint is correct here, but since Merricks does not raise this objection, I won’t worry 
about cluttering up the account in the body of the paper to fix this defect.
20Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” p. 288 n. 10.
21Or perhaps not, if body-switching is possible.
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wouldn’t be true even if his body had been preserved like Lenin’s), so he 
is not embodied.22
Merricks therefore has no good objection to this account of embodi-
ment. It allows souls to be disembodied. It allows the Son to be embodied 
in one body only, and for the Father and Spirit to remain unembodied. The 
account also survives the objections I have raised to the other accounts 
discussed, for there is no problem with the insane, the neurologically mal-
functioning, or young children being embodied.
I have argued that Merricks’s objections to several dualist accounts of 
embodiment are not compelling (and have sketched others that he did not 
mention). While I have doubts about some of them, each one allows for 
the unique incarnation of the Son. I therefore conclude that Merricks’s first 
claim, that dualism cannot provide a workable analysis of embodiment 
and dualistic incarnation, is false.
II. Humanness
Merricks’s second major contention is that embodiment, for dualists, is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for being human.
But I would prefer an account of the Incarnation according to which the 
Son’s coming to have a human body is at least a necessary condition for his 
becoming human. Dualism, as we have seen, is not such an account. Dual-
ism makes the Son’s becoming human one thing and his becoming embod-
ied something else altogether. This is my second Incarnation-based objection 
to dualism.23
What is his support for the claim that being human does not entail being 
embodied? Merricks asserts that “dualists typically allow that you and I 
can continue to exist—and continue to be human—after our body dies, 
even before resurrection.”24 If we remain human after death, then it is pos-
sible to be human without being embodied. But if this is possible, then 
presumably the Son could have become human without acquiring a hu-
man body, and Merricks takes this to be objectionable.
But worse, being embodied is not sufficient for being human, and so 
dualism allows for an account of the incarnation like the following, which 
Merricks labels “The Heretical Theory”:
God the Son is fully divine. But he is not fully human. Nevertheless, ever 
since the virgin conception and birth over two thousand years ago, he has 
been related to the body of Jesus just as a normal human soul is related to its 
body. So God the Son controls the body of Jesus. Moreover, he knows what 
happens in and around that body. He even has experiences such as hunger 
and pain and seeing red caused by that body.25
22I am very grateful to two reviewers for comments on my previous handling of this ob-
jection, as well as to Kenny Boyce for very helpful conversation.
23Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” p. 293.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
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Again, the dualist can resist this objection. First, there is nothing in du-
alism that requires that it be possible to become human without being em-
bodied. It is my impression that dualists (at least those who are philoso-
phers) typically believe that we are neither essentially human nor human 
while disembodied.26 Alvin Plantinga, for example, argues that
The property of being a human person (as opposed to that of being a divine 
person or an angelic person or a person simpliciter) may entail the posses-
sion of a body; it may be that whatever, in a given world, has the property 
of being a human person has a body in that world. It does not follow that 
Socrates, who is in fact a human person, has the property of having a body 
in every world he graces.27
Swinburne claims that although a soul can survive the destruction of its 
body, “such a soul would not then, on the understanding which I have 
given to ‘man’ . . . be a man . . . .”28 Similarly, Moreland and Craig claim 
that to be human just is to be a rational soul embodied in a human body, 
entailing that we lose humanness during disembodiment.29 Furthermore, 
dualists have good reason to hold this view. Suppose that after I die, God 
creates a Klingon body and causes me to be embodied in it. Am I still 
human? Obviously not, for I’m Klingon. But then consider me after the 
death of my human body and a Klingon after the death of his body. Why 
think that one of us is human and one of us is Klingon, since either of 
us could be embodied in either type of body? It seems the natural thing 
to say is that neither of us is human or Klingon. Rather, we are simply 
rational souls capable of being embodied in a variety of types of bodies 
(Hobbit, Kryptonian, even Hutt). Contrary to Merricks’s portrayal, dual-
ists have good reasons to think that embodiment is a necessary condition 
of being human.
Second, it is not clear that dualism can be tarred with “The Heretical 
Theory.” Is it really possible to be embodied in a human body and yet fail 
to be human? Plantinga famously argued that Socrates could have been 
an alligator, since it is possible for Socrates to be embodied in an alliga-
tor body.30 If so, then embodiment is not only necessary but sufficient for 
being an alligator, and presumably the same goes for being human. But 
even if Plantinga is wrong, what is to prevent the dualist from avoiding 
“The Heretical Theory” by adding to his account of the incarnation the 
claim that the Son also had whatever properties are, with embodiment, 
sufficient for humanness? For example, some dualists have proposed that 
26In Merricks’s defense, I am aware of an account of the incarnation that appears to en-
dorse the possibility of our being disembodied humans and the Son’s becoming human 
without becoming embodied. See Garrett J. DeWeese, “One Person, Two Natures: Two Meta-
physical Models of the Incarnation,” in Jesus in Trinitarian Perspective, ed. Fred Sanders and 
Klaus Issler (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2007), pp. 135–149, especially 141 and 144.
27Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 67.
28Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, pp. 146–147.
29Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, pp. 608–609.
30Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 65.
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in addition to acquiring a human body, the Son also voluntarily limited 
his conscious awareness to the types of things humans are typically aware 
of. While still omniscient, the majority of his knowledge was subconscious 
or non-occurrent.31 There is nothing here inconsistent with dualism, and it 
seems hard to deny that a person with a human body and a human type 
of consciousness is human.
Merricks stated that “I would prefer an account of the Incarnation ac-
cording to which the Son’s coming to have a human body is at least a 
necessary condition for his becoming human.” I reply that dualism, as we 
have seen, is precisely such an account. Without a body, the Son is no more 
human than he is Kryptonian. It is in acquiring a body of a certain type, 
perhaps with limiting his consciousness, that he becomes human.32 Thus, 
Merricks’s second objection to dualism fails.
III. Physicalism
Merricks’s third main contention is that Christians should be physical-
ists about human persons, for physicalism does not face the objections he 
raised against dualism. Merricks’s animalist version of physicalism says 
that a person P is embodied in body x iff P is identical to x.33 There is thus 
no problem with the Son’s being uniquely embodied in Jesus’ body, for 
the Son is identical to that body and no other. Nor is there a problem with 
the Father and the Spirit being embodied in Jesus’ body, for they are not 
identical to that body (or any other). Moreover, physicalism requires the 
Son to become incarnate in order to become human, for to become human 
is just to become a human body. Physicalism thus avoids the problems 
dualists are faced with, and so is a superior account of human persons and 
the incarnation.34
I grant that physicalism does not face these difficulties. Of course, as 
I’ve argued above, neither does dualism. Thus, physicalism has no advan-
tage here. Indeed, I think that Merricks’s physicalism is at a disadvantage. 
The incarnation favors dualism, not physicalism.
Plantinga has raised the following objection to Merricks-style accounts 
of the incarnation.
If, however, as materialists assert, to be a human being is to be a material 
object, then the second person of the Trinity must have become a material 
object. If he has remained a human being, furthermore, he is presently a 
31DeWeese, “One Person, Two Natures,” pp. 145–146; Moreland and Craig, Philosophical 
Foundations for a Christian Worldview, pp. 610–612.
32For accounts of the Incarnation along these lines, see Richard Swinburne, The Christian 
God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 192–196; Alvin Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind, and 
Truth,” Faith and Philosophy 16.2 (1999), pp. 183–185; Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foun-
dations for a Christian Worldview, pp. 606–613; Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The 
Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 50–61.
33It is perhaps worth noting that animalism per se does not commit one to such an account 
of embodiment. See Eric Olson, The Human Animal (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), pp. 142–143.
34Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” p. 297.
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material object. But then an immaterial being became a material object; and 
this seems to me to be impossible. It is clearly impossible, I’d say, that the 
number seven or the proposition that 7 + 5 = 12, or the property of self-ex-
emplification, all of which are immaterial objects, should become, turn into, 
material objects. It is less clearly impossible, but still impossible, it seems to 
me, that the second person of the Trinity—that personal being with will and 
intellect and affection—should turn into a material object.35
Merricks’s response to this argument is puzzling. He grants that it may 
seem impossible for an immaterial object to become material,36 but claims 
that it seems just as impossible on a dualist view of persons for the Son to 
become human. Why is this? He claims that the intuitions against an im-
material object’s becoming material rest on “kind-essentialism,” the doc-
trine that “if something is a member of a natural kind, then it is essentially 
a member of that kind.” Since physical object is a natural kind, anything 
physical is essentially physical, entailing that the Son cannot possibly be-
come a physical object.37 Merricks’s problem with this argument is that 
human soul is also a natural kind, so the Son can no more become a human 
soul than he can become a physical object. Thus, kind-essentialism is in-
consistent with basic Christian doctrine and so must be rejected. But once 
this is done, “it is hard to see why the non-physical God the Son could not 
become a physical human organism.”38
Suppose we grant that the intuition against physicalist incarnation rests 
on kind-essentialism. The dualist can accept this and still dodge Merricks’s 
objection. Why think that human soul is a natural kind? Merricks does not 
claim that the corresponding physical kind is human body. Rather, it is the 
very general physical object. What prevents the dualist from construing the 
relevant natural kind as immaterial object or, perhaps better, immaterial sub-
stance? In any case, the dualist (at least those dualists I have been discuss-
ing in this paper) will deny that human soul is a natural kind. A human 
soul is just a soul embodied in a human body. Since that soul could be em-
bodied in non-human bodies as well, there is no more a human soul natural 
kind than there is a Chinese soul or philosophy professor soul natural kind.39 
Perhaps rational soul is a natural kind, but since the second person of the 
Trinity is already a member of this kind, there is no barrier to his becom-
ing a human soul, as Merricks claims. Dualism therefore has no problem 
with kind-essentialism, while physicalism obviously does.
Nevertheless, Merricks’s claim that Plantinga’s argument presupposes 
kind-essentialism is dubious. Plantinga does not appeal to natural kinds. 
Why not think instead that he finds something impossible in the claim 
that something immaterial at one time becomes material at another time, 
35Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth,” p. 186.
36He does not actually grant that it seems impossible. Rather, he grants that it might seem 
impossible to physicalism’s opponents. See Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh,” p. 296.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, pp. 52–55.
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irrespective of any kinds involved? Consequently, I suggest that the in-
tuition that immaterial objects cannot become material does not rest on 
kind-essentialism, but rather on the idea that immateriality entails proper-
ties which are plausibly thought to be essentially had by everything that 
has them and are inconsistent with properties entailed by materiality. For 
example, one might plausibly think that immateriality entails non-spati-
ality and that nothing non-spatial could acquire a spatial location.40 Simi-
larly, an immaterial, non-spatial entity is unextended, but one might think 
that an unextended object could not come to be extended.
But suppose we grant that these things are indeed possible. Perhaps a 
soul could become some kind of point particle or even an extended simple. 
Merricks’s account of the incarnation would still not escape the thrust of 
Plantinga’s argument, for it does not follow that the second person of the 
Trinity could become a human organism. Physicalist incarnation would 
require, for example, that a necessary being could be wholly composed of 
contingent parts, and one might be doubtful about this.41 Alternatively, the 
Son’s becoming a human organism entails that it is possible for a simple—
an entity with no proper parts whatsoever—to become composite. But this 
seems impossible.42
If an argument is needed for this impossibility, consider one inspired by 
the Paradox of Increase.43
(1) A simple object x incorporates y as a part at time t.
(2) Necessarily, nothing can have a single proper part.
(3) At t, x is composed of y and the complement of y (i.e., all of x except 
for y).
(4) The complement of y exists prior to t.
(5) Prior to t, x has all of the same parts as the complement of y.
(6) Necessarily, two distinct objects cannot have all of the same parts 
at the same time.
From these premises, we can derive that x is identical to one of its proper 
parts, a contradiction. For the original Paradox of Increase (involving 
40To ward off a possible confusion, while I previously put forward the “spatial souls” 
version of embodiment as an option for dualists, I did not do so because I find it a plausible 
view. Rather, some dualists believe it and none of Merricks’s objections to Swinburne apply 
to it.
41As are Stephen T. Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Be-
lief in God,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 89; and Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the 
Mind of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 253. Tom Flint has also point-
ed out that the parts are not merely contingent but also created, which seems to entail that on 
Merricks’s theory the Son becomes a creature, which is, to put it mildly, objectionable.
42Roderick Chisholm, “Reply to Philip L. Quinn,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chish-
olm, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), p. 68.
43Eric Olson, “The Paradox of Increase,” The Monist 89.3 (2006), pp. 390–417.
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composite objects acquiring parts), Merricks is most likely to favor deny-
ing (3), as it would be a consequence of the Doctrine of Arbitrary Unde-
tached Parts (DAUP), and a good case can be made against this princi-
ple.44 However, when applied to simples, (3) would seem to be true, even 
if DAUP is false. (4), (5), and (6) also appear to be true. But then (1) must 
be false; simples cannot gain parts.
The only way out for Merricks that I can see, short of adopting a meta-
physical thesis (like that of temporal parts) that he rejects, is to claim that 
this sort of argument shows that a simple cannot incorporate a single 
proper part at a time, but it could incorporate multiple proper parts at a 
time. (5) is obviously true if x is incorporating a single part, but perhaps 
it is false if x acquires two or more parts at t. I must confess that I don’t 
have a decisive argument against this kind of response, but it strikes me as 
weak. For instance, it would require the falsity of the following principle:
(7) If, at t, x incorporates n parts (and loses no parts), then, at t, x has 
at least n + 1 proper parts.45
In any ordinary case, the principle seems true. For example, if a carrot 
nose is added to a snowman made of three large snowballs at t, then at t 
the snowman has four proper parts (at that level of decomposition). More-
over, the proposed way out has bizarre consequences. If a simple tries 
to acquire a single part, it will fail, but if it tries for two or more it might 
succeed? That is like saying that a composite object with only two proper 
parts cannot lose one of its parts without ceasing to exist, but it could lose 
both and still exist (e.g., if God annihilated one of its parts, He would 
be annihilating the whole as well, but if He annihilated both parts at the 
same time, it could persist through such a loss). Worse, the parts must be 
incorporated at exactly the same time. If the simple tries to incorporate one 
part a picosecond before the other, it will fail. But could the possibility of 
incorporating a new part really hang on such a short period of time?46
It seems, then, that Plantinga’s argument against physicalist incarna-
tion does not require kind-essentialism, for there are plenty of other rea-
sons one might have for thinking it impossible for an immaterial entity, 
particularly a divine immaterial entity, to become material. I have focused 
on Plantinga’s objection to physicalist incarnation, but there are other 
problems as well. For example, Merricks’s account entails that it is pos-
sible for a material object to be omniscient, and this is at least dubious, 
even if material objects can think (and, of course, there are well-known 
44Peter van Inwagen, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts,” Pacific Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 62 (1981), pp. 123–137; Merricks, Objects and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001), pp. 48–53.
45(7) could use some precisifying (e.g., by adding language about levels of decompo-
sition), but that much detail would only clutter up the paper without adding anything 
helpful.
46I am grateful to Josh Rasmussen for very helpful discussion of my argument for simples 
being essentially simple.
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objections to the possibility of a material object’s thinking).47 But it is not 
necessary to discuss these issues. Merricks claimed that physicalism offers 
a superior account of the incarnation to that of dualism, and this is not the 
case. Even if all of the objections I have raised against physicalist incarna-
tion have no merit whatsoever, this would at most leave physicalism and 
dualism on a par.
The above objections, however, do have some force. Consequently, 
Merricks is mistaken in thinking that the incarnation points us toward 
physicalism. His objections to dualist incarnation may be resisted and his 
own account entails the following.
(8) Possibly, a non-spatial object becomes spatial.
(9) Possibly, an unextended object becomes spatially extended.
(10) Possibly, a necessary being is wholly composed of contingent 
parts.
(11) Possibly, a simple becomes composite.
Many will find (8) through (11) impossible.48 The incarnation, therefore, 
does not point us toward physicalism. On the contrary, given the incarna-
tion, Christians should be dualists.49
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47See Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. 
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 105–118, 
136–141.
48For the record, all of them strike me as impossible, but if I bracket my sympathies for 
compositional nihilism, then I find (8), (9), and (11) impossible and (10) dubious.
49I am grateful for helpful discussion and comments on previous drafts of this paper to 
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